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Abstract—Invisible units mainly refer to small-scale units that
are not monitored by, and thus are not visible to utilities. Integra-
tion of these invisible units into power systems does significantly
affect the way in which a distribution grid is planned and
operated. This paper, based on random matrix theory (RMT),
proposes a statistical, data-driven framework to handle the
massive grid data, in contrast to its deterministic, model-based
counterpart. Combining the RMT-based data-mining framework
with conventional techniques, some heuristics are derived as the
solution to the invisible units detection and estimation task: linear
eigenvalue statistic indicators (LESs) are suggested as the main
ingredients of the solution; according to the statistical properties
of LESs, the hypothesis testing is formulated to conduct change
point detection in the high-dimensional space. The proposed
method is promising for anomaly detection and pertinent to
current distribution networks—it is capable of detecting invisible
power usage and fraudulent behavior while even being able to
locate the suspect’s location. Case studies, using both simulated
data and actual data, validate the proposed method.
Index Terms—invisible unit, data-mining framework, statistical
property, random matrix theory, linear eigenvalue statistic.
I. INTRODUCTION
FUTURE grids will be fundamentally different from cur-rent ones [1]. Technology development, environment
pressure, and market reform have greatly spurred the deploy-
ment of distributed, renewable, and even plug-and-play units,
on both the power generation and the power consumption
sides. These units are mostly invisible to utilities—they are
not monitored by, and thus are not visible to grid operators.
1) Accessing distributed units data into utility systems requires
an enormous cost of data acquisition, communication, storage,
calculation, and security [2]. 2) It is difficult to describe
these units using a deterministic model; they are small in
size but large in amount, and most of them are with high
uncertainty or individuality. 3) Some behavior, such as power
theft [3], unauthorized PV installation [4], and cyberattack [5],
is essentially invisible.
Lack of visibility may cause incorrect planning and oper-
ation of power systems, and even worse, damage to system
equipment and customer appliances. In an environment highly
penetrated by invisible units, utilities face technical problems
related to overvoltage, frequency control, back feeding flow,
and other issues such as a rapid decrease in revenue. Moreover,
the transparency of the grid is the basis for some advanced
management such as dynamic scheduling, demand response.
To enhance the visibility of the network, distribution utilities
have begun deploying data collectors such as phasor measure-
ment units (PMUs) [6]. High resolution voltage and current
measurements can be used in a plethora of applications for
monitoring, diagnostic, and control purposes, such as state
estimation, customer profiling, and anomaly detection [7].
In the invisible units detection and estimation task, we
deal with a large number (called N ) of nodes simultaneously.
Each node collects a massive data samples (called T ) for a
given period of observation. A classical statistic theory treats a
fixed N only. This fixed N is called low-dimensional regime.
In practice, we are interested in the case that N can vary
arbitrarily in size compared with T. This fundamental require-
ment is the primary driving force for us to choose RMT
as the analysis theory. Indeed, the joint distribution of the
eigenvalues is analyzed by RMT as the statistic analytics from
big data. To our best knowledge, RMT is developed to address
this high-dimensional regime since the classical statistic theory
applies to the low-dimensional regime only [8]. Our big data
analytics exploit the high-dimensional phenomenon that occurs
often in a modern grid. Our special view of angle is expected
to contribute some novel algorithms to the community. The
connection of our task with RMT may has deep impact on
our community.
Lots of work has been done to study the impacts and risks
of invisible units [9]. Little attention, however, has been paid
to detection and estimation of said invisible units, especially in
the context of a complex distributed grid. Some related works
are found in the special issue of “Big Data Analytics for Grid
Modernization” [10]. Reference [11] proposes a change-point
detection algorithm, which is relevant to our paper to an extent.
Reference [4] takes the uncertainty into account, and estimates
the power generation of unauthorized PV installation using
data generated from a small set of selected representative sites.
Reference [12] proposes an approach for anomaly detection
and causal impact analysis using a two-layer dynamic optimal
synchrophasor measurement devices selection algorithm. Our
previous work [1, 13, 14], based on RMT, outlines a data-
driven framework of big data analytics for power systems. Our
RMT-based framework, via spectrum analysis, studies the
statistical information which is unique in high-dimensional
space. Besides, the linear eigenvalue statistic (LES) and its
statistical properties and advantages, as well as some RMT-
relevant operations, are discussed.
A. Contribution
This paper aims at a challenging and pertinent task to cur-
rent distribution networks—detection and estimation of invis-
ible units. Combining the RMT-based data-mining framework
with classical hypothesis testing techniques, some heuristics
are derived as the solution to the task. RMT and the relevant
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2operations, which perform well in uncertainty processing in
high-dimensional space, are employed to conduct feature ex-
traction from the massive temporal-spatial data. Linear eigen-
value statistic indicators (LESs), which are robust against
data errors (e.g., data loss, data out-of-synchronization [14])
and insusceptible to random noises (e.g., white noises [1]),
are employed as the features. Based on the statistical properties
of LESs, a hypothesis testing is formulated to conduct change
point (CP) detection for invisible units modeling. The technical
route for the task is given in Fig. 1 in Section III-G. The
method is model-free and only relies on easily accessible
utility data, yet it is effective and fairly powerful—Fig. 5
in Section IV-D shows that a much more accurate result is
obtained using our method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II maps the invisible units detection and estimation task onto
a mathematical model. Section III studies the mathematical
tools to handle the aforementioned model, and then gives a
full picture for the task. Section IV and V, with the simulated
cases and real-system cases respectively, validate the proposed
method. Section VI presents the conclusions of this research.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Definition of TLPs and ULPs
This paper attempts to conduct invisible units detection
and estimation in a non-omniscient distribution network. More
precisely, we aim to obtain users (loads/generators) behavior
and accordingly volume at the node level.
From the aspect of users behavior, the loads/generators are
divided into two categories: typical load pattern units (TLPs)
and uncertain load pattern units (ULPs).
1) TLPs operate according to well-defined profiles, which
are denoted as vectors p(α)i . TLPs’ patterns are known
in advance—they can be checked by the users based
on the daily routine or learned via cluster algorithms
using historic data [15]. For instance, a street-lamp that
is set turning on at 18:00 and turning off at 06:00 is a
TLP; the street-lamp pattern is modeled as
pξ(t)=
{
1 t ∈ [00 : 00, 06 : 00] ∪ [18 : 00, 24 : 00]
0 t ∈ [06 : 00, 18 : 00] .
If the sampling interval is 6 hours, p(ξ) = [1, 0, 0, 1].
2) ULPs are also expressed in time-series, which are denoted
as vectors p(β)j . Comparing to TLPs’, ULPs’ patterns
are not accessible in advance or predictable. The
aforementioned invisible units, such as plug-and-play
EVs and climate-susceptible PVs, all belong to ULPs.
B. Classification of ULPs
ULPs can be further divided into three categories—random
behavior, invisible behavior, and fraudulent behavior. Our
previous work [1, 14], based on RMT, has already studied the
random behavior, and verified that the (independent) random
behavior, e.g., white noises, has little impact on the value
of LESs. This paper focuses on the left two—the invisible
behavior and the fraudulent one. The examples of the both
will be given and studied in Section IV-C.
The invisible behavior often causes a chain reaction and
has an impact on numerous parameters. For instance, the
PVs electricity generations do change the power flow of the
grid network. The fraudulent behavior, however, often causes
parameter deviation alone. For example, some metering errors
or power thefts may merely distort the power consumption
value P of some node without affecting other variables. The
differences between the two behavior above, from the
aspect of mathematic, will be revealed by temporal-spatial
correlations (among the multiple variables in time-series),
which only exist in the high-dimensional space.
C. Invisible Units Detection and Estimation Task Model
Considering the volume, we propose to study a general
model for each node:
p(Σ)︸︷︷︸
Observed Data
= a1p
(α)
1 + · · ·+ anp(α)n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Power Usage of TLPs
+ b1p
(β)
1 + · · ·+ bmp(β)m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Power Usage of ULPs
,
(1)
where vectors p(α)i stand for the daily patterns of TLPs, with
the coefficients (volume) ai, i=1, ..., n, and accordingly, p
(β)
j
for ULPs, with the coefficients bj , j = 1, ...,m. As a result,
vector aip
(α)
i is the daily power usage for the i-th TLP,
similarly vector bjp
(β)
j for the j-th ULP.
For the invisible units detection and estimation task, the
existence of ULPs need to be detected, and furthermore,
the pattern of invisible units p(β)j , as well as the coefficients
(volume) ai, bj , need to be estimated.
If all units’ pattern and behavior are known in advance, i.e.,
no p(β)j exists, or if ULPs are able to be modeled as routine
p
(α)
n+j instead of uncertain p
(β)
j , then Eq. (1) is turned into
p(Σ) = a1p
(α)
1 + a2p
(α)
2 + · · ·+ an+mp(α)n+m. (2)
Eq. (2) can be solved through a systematic procedure.
arg min
a
∥∥∥Pa− p(Σ)∥∥∥ (3)
where P=
[
p
(α)
1 · · · p(α)n+m
]
, a=
[
a1 · · · an+m
]T
.
Using the least squares method, the estimated value of a is
obtained as
aˆ =
(
PTP
)−1
PTp(Σ) (4)
It is worth mentioning that the analysis of reactive power
Q may be conducted in a similar way.
In a modern distribution network, ULPs bjp
(β)
j are present
and their influences need to be considered. The existence
of ULPs violates the prerequisites of most algorithms (e.g.,
least squares method) and may cause significant bias on the
estimated values of coefficients ai starting from Eq. (4).
Without a fairly correct ULPs detection, spurious results
may be obtained, just as illustrated in Fig. 5 in Section IV-D.
In most scenarios, it is reasonable to model p(β)j as a step
signal. This is the case when EVs charge or PVs generate
during ta to tb. Determining the start point ta and the end
point tb of the step signal is at the heart of p
(β)
j modeling.
3III. MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATION
A. Random Matrix Theory
1) Statistics based on Random Matrix Theory:
Random matrices have been an important issue in multi-
variate statistical analysis since the landmark work of Wishart
on fixed size Gaussian matrices. Asymptotic theory on the
limiting spectrum of large random matrices was initially pro-
posed in several works [16] by Wigner in the 1950s, motivated
by problems in quantum physics. Since then, research on
finite spectral analysis of high dimensional random matrices
has come under heated discussion by scholars in numerous
disciplines [8]. RMT, as a statistical tool with profound
theoretical basis, is adapted to multivariate analysis. It can help
model many intractable practical systems, especially those
with numerous variables.
2) Laws for Spectral Analysis:
RMT says that for a Laguerre unitary ensemble (LUE)
matrix A∈CN×T (c=N/T ≤ 1), its empirical spectral density
(ESD) gA (x) follows Marchenko-Pastur (M-P) Law [17]:
gA (x) =
1
2picx
√
(x− a) (b− x), x ∈ [a, b] (5)
where a = (1−√c)2, b = (1 +√c)2.
3) Universality Principle of RMT:
This universality principle [18] enables us to obtain the
exact asymptotic distributions of various test statistics without
restrictive distributional assumptions of matrix entries. For
a real system with massive temporal-spatial data, we cannot
expect the matrix entries to follow i.i.d. distribution. One can
perform various hypothesis testings under the assumption
that the matrix entries are not Gaussian distributed but
use the same test statistics as in the Gaussian case.
Numerous studies using both grid network data [14] and power
transmission equipment data [19] demonstrate that the M-
P Law and Ring Law are universally valid—the asymptotic
results are remarkably accurate for engineering data with
relatively moderate matrix sizes such as tens. This is the
very reason why RMT can handle practical massive systems.
B. Connection between RMT and our Task
1) Connection with Random Matrix Theory:
The observed data, given in Eq. (1), consist of multiple
variables in time-series. And each variable, i.e., the data of a
single node, is a mixture of multiple signals—noises (ULPs),
given signals (TLPs), and unknown signals (ULPs). Under the
view of the whole gird network, there should be some high-
dimensional statistic information among these signals, said
temporal-spatial correlations. Indeed, further division can be
made; for instance, the noises can be divided into white noises
and colored noises, and the given signals can be expressed
in terms of diverse models such as those based on ARMA
processes [19] and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes [20]. The
division topic will be discussed elsewhere and this paper fo-
cuses on the step signal detection as mentioned in Section II-C,
which is an essential anomaly detection task, by utilizing the
temporal-spatial data via signal analysis algorithms designing.
The signal analysis algorithms are often designed based
on the characteristics of the raw data. For instance, low
rank matrix completion (LRMC) are based on low rank [21],
and sparse principal component analysis (sparse PCA) based
on sparsity [22]. Similarly, based on the temporal-spatial
correlations, we propose our RMT-based framework.
The signal analysis aiming at extracting the informative
statistics (big data analytics) from the massive data, as men-
tioned in Section I, is a challenge that does not meet the
prerequisites of most conventional tools. The task has some
connection with the field of communication, in particular,
massive MIMO (Multiple-Input Multiple-Output) technology
in work [23]. In the neighbor communication field, RMT has
already been fully proved as an effective and popular tool
through hundreds of thousands of published studies. In the
field of power systems, however, there are much fewer RMT-
relevant researches.
2) Connection with Other Potential Algorithms:
The supervised learning mode is also adapted to han-
dle high-dimensional data. In a supervised learning context,
ground truth data can be exploited to seek parameters au-
tomatically. For instance, the state-of-the-art deep learning
algorithm does select some non-handcrafted features (called
deep features) from the massive labeled dataset without much
prior knowledge, so that it can be generalized to different cases
without making significant modifications. The deep learning
algorithm holds a competitive advantage over our paradigm.
Our paradigm, however, has an advantage of transparency—
the algorithm is deeply rooted in RMT. Unifying time and
space through their ratio c = T/N , RMT deals with temporal-
spatial data mathematically rigorously. Linear eigenvalue
statistics (LESs), built from data matrices, follow Gaussian
distributions for very general conditions, and other statis-
tical variables are studied due to the latest breakthroughs
in probability on the central limit theorems (CLTs) of those
LESs. The statistical properties of these variables are mostly
derivable and provable. In this sense, our work is fundamental
in nature. Besides, RMT performs well with moderate-size
(unlabeled) data, which is often true in engineering.
C. Linear Eigenvalue Statistics and its Central Limit Theorem
The LES τ of an arbitrary matrix Γ ∈ CN×N is defined in
[24, 25] via the continuous test function ϕ : C→ C,
τϕ =
∑N
i=1ϕ(λi) = Trϕ (Γ) , (6)
where the trace of the function of a random matrix is involved.
1) Law of Large Numbers:
The Law of Large Numbers tells us that N−1τϕ converges
in probability to the limit
lim
N→∞
1
N
∑N
i=1ϕ(λi)=
∫
ϕ(λ)ρ(λ) dλ, (7)
where ρ(λ) is the probability density function (PDF) of λ.
2) Central Limit Theorem:
CLT, as the natural second step, aims to study the fluctua-
tions of LES.
4Theorem III.1 (M. Sheherbina, 2009, [25]). Consider a
random matrix X ∈ RN×T in N×T size, and M is the
covariance matrix M= 1NXX
H. The CLT for M is given as
follows: Let the real valued test function ϕ satisfy condition
‖ϕ‖3/2+ε<∞ (ε > 0). Then τϕ, as defined in Eq. (6), in the
limit N,T→∞, c=N/T ≤ 1, converges in the distribution to
the Gaussian random variable with the mean E(τϕ), according
to Eq. (7), and the variance:
σ2(τϕ) =
2
cpi2
∫∫
−pi2<θ1,θ2<pi2
ψ2 (θ1, θ2) (1− sin θ1 sin θ2) dθ1dθ2
+
κ4
pi2
(∫ pi
2
−pi2
ϕ (ζ (θ)) sin θdθ
)2
,
(8)
where ψ (θ1, θ2)=
[ϕ(ζ(θ))]|θ=θ1θ=θ2
[ζ(θ)]|θ=θ1θ=θ2
, [ζ (θ)] |θ=θ1θ=θ2 =ζ (θ1)−ζ (θ2) ,
and ζ (θ) = 1+1/c+2/
√
c sin θ; κ4 =E
(
Xij
4
)−3 is the 4-th
cumulant of entries of X.
To study the convergence as a function of N, we study LES
instead of the probability distribution of eigenvalues in Eq. (5).
For an arbitrary test function with enough smoothness, LES
τ (see it as a random variable Y ) is a positive scalar random
variable defined in Eq. (6). As N→∞, the asymptotic limit of
its expectation, E (Y ) , is given in Eq. (7), and the asymptotic
limit of its variance, σ2 (Y ) , is given in Eq. (8). These
two equations are sufficient to study the scalar random
variable Y. This approach can be viewed as a dimensionality
reduction—the random data matrix of size N×T is reduced to
a positive scalar random variable Y ! This dimension reduction
is mathematically rigorous only when N,T→∞ but NT → c.
Experiences demonstrate, however, that moderate values of
N and T are accurate enough for our practical purposes.
D. LES-based Hypothesis Testing Designing for CP Detection
Change-point (CP) detection began with Page’s (1954,
1955) classical formulation, which was further developed by
Shiryaev (1963) and Lorden (1971) [26]. CP detection is the
following problem: suppose X1, X2, · · · , Xm are independent
observations. For j ≤ M, they have distribution F0; for
j>M, they have distribution F1. The distributions F1 may be
completely specified or may depend on unknown parameters.
In the case of a fixed number m of observations, we would
like to test the null hypothesis of no change, that F0 =F1, and
to estimate M .
This paper formulates the hypothesis testing, for the massive
dataset, in terms of the statistical properties of LES. As
aforementioned, LES, in the limit N,T → ∞, c=N/T ≤ 1,
converges in the distribution to a Gaussian random variable τϕ
with mean E(τϕ), according to Eq. (7), and variance σ2(τϕ),
according to Eq. (8). Moreover, our previous work shows that
LES is robust against data errors (e.g., data loss, data out-
of-synchronization [14]) and insusceptible to (independent)
random noises (not limited to white noises [1]), which is
not true to those low dimensional statistics such as mean
and variance of any single variable. All of these statistical
properties make LES a good feature for a hypothesis testing
designing aiming at anomaly detection task.
Referring the Gaussian property and standard scores
[27]1, the detection is modeled as a binary hypothesis testing:
the normal hypothesis H0 (no anomaly present) and the
abnormal one H1, denoted by:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
H0 :
∣∣∣∣τϕ − E(τϕ)σ(τϕ)
∣∣∣∣ < ,
H1 :
∣∣∣∣τϕ − E(τϕ)σ(τϕ)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ , (9)
where  is a threshold value that needs to be preset.
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned Gaussian
property and standard scores do offer a reference for setting the
threshold value ; for instance, at a significance level 0.05, the
 should be set at 1.96. However, when setting the threshold
range for possible applications in the real world, we should
take account of many other factors, e.g., the performance of
the real-time τϕ−t curve, the experiment with the historical
data, the experience of the problem solver, and other statistical
hypothesis testings such as Student’s t-test.
E. Matrices Concatenation Operation
Numerous causing factors affect the system state in differ-
ent ways. Sensitivity analysis is a valuable and hot topic. The
sampling data are in the form of multiple time-series, and we
assume that there are N state variables and M factors. Within a
fixed period of interest ti (i=1,. . ., T ), the sampling data of N
state variables consist of matrix B∈CN×T (i.e. state matrix),
and the factors consist of vector cTj ∈ C1×T (j = 1,. . .,M)
(i.e. factor vector). Two matrices with the same length can be
put together and thus a new concatenated matrix is formed.
In such a way, matrix Aj is formed by concatenating state
matrix B with factor vector cTj .
In order to balance the proportion (to increase statistic
correlation), a factor matrix Cj is formed by duplicating each
factor vector cTj for K times
2, written as
Cj =
[
cj cj · · · cj
]T ∈ CK×T .
Then, white noise is introduced into Cj to avoid extremely
strong cross-correlations. Thus, factor matrix Dj for factor
vector cTj is expressed as
Dj = Cj + ηjR (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m), (10)
where ηj is related to signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and matrix
R is a standard Gaussian Random Matrix.
In parallel, we construct concatenated matrix Aj with each
factor cTj , expressed as
Aj =
[
B
Dj
]
∈ C(N+K)×T (j = 1, 2, . . . ,m). (11)
1Standard scores are also called z-values, z-scores, normal scores, and stan-
dardized variables. They are most frequently used to compare an observation
to a theoretical deviate, such as a standard normal deviate.
2Empirically, K ≈ 0.3×N. [13]
5Relationships between causing factors cTj and system state
B can be revealed by concatenated matrix Aj . This concate-
nated model is compatible with different units and different
measurements for each variable data which are in the form of
rows of Aj , due to the normalization during data preprocess-
ing. It is worth mentioning that some mathematical methods,
e.g., interpolation, may be applied to handle sensor data with
different sampling rates.
F. Experiment Design for Power Systems
For power systems, voltage magnitudes U and power con-
sumptions P are preferred for the following reasons: 1) they
are easily accessible and usually at a high accuracy; 2) they
belong to measurement parameters, which are independent
from network topology; and 3) our previous work [1] proves
that, for certain scenarios, different types of streaming data,
such as V and I , may have similar statistical properties in
high dimensional space. Similar to Eq. (11), Fj is formed as
Fj =
[
U
P
(Σ)
j
]
∈ C(N+K)×T (j = 1, 2, . . . , N). (12)
The state matrix U ∈ CN×T consists of voltage magnitudes
[U ]j,t(j = 1, · · · , N, t = 1, · · · , T ), and the j-th factor
matrix P(Σ)j ∈CK×T consists of active power consumptions
[P
(Σ)
j ]k,t(j=1, · · · , N, k=1, · · · ,K, t=1, · · · , T ) according
to Eq. (10).
G. Technical route for Detection and Estimation Task
Concluding Section II and III, we outline the flowchart to
make a full picture of processes for the invisible units detection
and estimation task, as shown in Fig. 1.
With the technical route given in Fig. 1, we make a progress
to our task from the conventional techniques such as change
point detection and least squares methods. Employing RMT-
based framework, our method conducts big data analytics
mathematically rigorously to the massive dataset. Based
on spectrum analysis, some statistical properties which are
unique in high-dimensional space are utilized. For instance,
to the statistic LES, its value is robust against data errors and
insusceptible to random noises as said in Section III-D, but it
is not true to those low dimensional statistics such as mean
and variance of any single variable. That is a major reason
why we choose RMT-based framework and LESs.
Fig. 5 validates the effectiveness of the proposed method—
a much more accurate estimation of coefficient values for
the components is obtained.
IV. SIMULATION CASES
A. Background
Simulations are based on an IEEE-33 System for a distri-
bution network. For Node j(j = 1, · · · , 33), its gross power
usage p(Σ)j and voltage magnitude uj are sampled at a high
rate, for example, 9600 points per day (0.11 Hz). The white
noise is added to the power injections as
y˜nt = ynt (1 + γ1z1) + γ2z2, (13)
Model ULPs pj
(β)  as pn+j 
(α)  to turn Eq. (1) into a 
classical optimization problem as Eq. (2)
        Conduct Detection of Invisible Units
Map invisible units detection and estimation task 
onto a mathematical model as Eq. (1)
Model ULP  pj
(β)  as a Step Signal 
(e.g., EVs charge or PVs generate) 
 Determining the start point ta and the end 
point tb of the step signal
Estimate coefficients ai of TLPs pi
(α) and bj of
ULPs pn+j 
(α) via least squares method as Eq. (4)
CPs detection via hypothesis test as Eq. (9)
CPs analysis
Framework of big data analytic via RMT 
(Laws for spectral analysis as Eq. (5), Definition
of LES as Eq. (6), RMT-based operation such
as matrices concatenation as Eq. (11)
Statistical properties of LES as Eq. (7), (8)
Fig. 1: Flowchart of RMT-based detection and estimation task
where z1 and z2 are two standard Gaussian random variables,
i.e. z1, z2∼N (0, 1) ; γ1 = 0.005, γ2 = 0.02. In this way, the
power flow is obtained via Matpower [28].
As mentioned in Sec. II, we mainly focus on fraudulent
behavior and invisible power usage. Determining the start
point and the end point of p(β)i is the main focus of this
study. For longstanding anomalies without sudden change in
the observed data segment, some long-term indicators, such as
monthly line loss rate, might be effective.
B. Fraud events in a Simple Scenario
Fraud events often cause parameter deviation alone. Sup-
pose that active power values P for each node stay around
their initial points with fluctuations given as Eq. (13). From
14:00 to 17:00, some fraud events on Node 6 and Node 14
cause a reduction of 0.005 MW (8.33% of P6, 4.17% of P14),
as shown in Fig. 2. The lines with legends data 1 to data 33
are for the actual power consumption on Node 1 to Node
33, and the lines with legends data 34 and data 35 are for
the measured power consumption on Node 14 and Node 6,
respectively. Note that due to the fraud events, the data with
legends data 14 and data 6 are not accessible.
Matrices concatenation operation and moving split window
analysis are employed for data analysis. According to Eq. (6),
we make N = 33, T = 100,∆T = 1, and choose Chebyshev
6polynomials T2: ϕ(x) = 2x2−1 as the test function. LESs τT2
of state matrix B and concatenated matrix Aj (j = 1, · · · , 33,
referring to Eq. (12)) are obtained in Fig. 3.
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In Fig. 3, LES τT2 of state matrix B, namely, τT2(B) is
almost constant. From a statistical view, the theoretical expec-
tation E(τT2) and the standard deviation σ(τT2) are accessible
via random matrix theory, or rather, via Eq. (7) and (8). It
is found that the experimental indicator τT2(B) is exactly
bounded between E(τT2)−1.96σ(τT2) and E(τT2)+1.96σ(τT2).
According to Eq. (9), we cannot reject the null (H0)—there
is no factor actually affecting the system state during the
observation period. On the other hand, the τT2 of state matrix
Ai, namely, τT2(Ai) has four spikes: two spikes for τT2(A6)
and two spikes for τT2(A14). Our previous work [1] tells us
that the anomaly signal should last for T time points (i.e.
T×0.15 minutes) and have an extreme point at T/2. This phe-
nomenon is observed on the τT2(A6)−t curve and τT2(A14)−t
curve: 5700−5600=100=T, 5652−5600≈ 50=T/2.
C. Invisible Unit Detection in a Complex Scenario
This subsection, focusing on fraudulent behavior and invisi-
ble behavior, proposes a data-driven solution to the task given
in Sec. II—determining the start point and the end point
to model the invisible unit p(β)j as a step signal. Firstly, the
following assumptions are made:
(I) Power usage on Node j(j = 1, · · · , 33) generally con-
sists of four TLPs and one ULP, denoted as
p
(Σ)
j = aj1p
(α)
1 + · · ·+ aj4p(α)4 + bj1p(β)1 . (14)
Daily load profiles of TLPs (p(α)1 , · · · ,p(α)4 ) are set as
Tab. I. Note that the blue-filled rectangle indicates that
the load profile has a dramatic change at this time point,
i.e., change point (CP) [11].
(II) Coefficients ai, bj(i=1, 2, 3, 4; j=1) are set as Tab II.
(III) Invisible power usage events exist on Node 20 and 31:
the periods are 1:00–5:00 and 14:00–20:00, and the
percentages are 30% and 50%, respectively.
(IV) Fraud events exist on Node 6, 14 and 27: the periods
are 20:00–22:00, 14:00–17:00 and 18:00–19:00, and the
percentages are 7%, 8% and 12%, respectively.
p1 p2 p3 p4 pu1 p1 p2 p3 p4 pu1
0 88 20 25 100 0 12 94 77 35 0 0
1 87 20 23 100 100 13 86 80 30 0 0
2 88 20 22 100 100 14 86 86 33 0 100
3 100 21 22 100 100 15 88 86 44 0 100
4 96 20 27 100 100 16 85 87 50 100 100
5 100 20 31 100 0 17 87 35 56 100 100
6 98 20 29 0 0 18 88 25 85 100 100
7 97 30 28 0 0 19 85 25 80 100 100
8 88 40 31 0 0 20 84 20 70 100 0
9 82 85 37 0 0 21 83 20 76 100 0
10 82 85 42 0 0 22 86 20 43 100 0
11 95 82 42 0 0 23 88 15 30 100 0
Note: blue-filled rectangle indicates CP.
TABLE I: TLPs, ULPs and their 24-hour power demands.
TABLE II: Coefficients of TLPs and ULP of each node.
a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 a1 a2 a3 a4 b1
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 2 0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0
3 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 4 0.05 0.75 0.1 0.1 0
5 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 6 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0
7 0.8 0.05 0.1 0.05 0 8 0.85 0.05 0 0.1 0
9 0.1 0.15 0.6 0.15 0 10 0 0.15 0.8 0.05 0
11 0 0.2 0.75 0.05 0 12 0.05 0.1 0.75 0.1 0
13 0.05 0.05 0.85 0.05 0 14 0.7 0.05 0.2 0.05 0
15 0 0.05 0.9 0.05 0 16 0 0 0.95 0.05 0
17 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 18 0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0
19 0 0.5 0.1 0.4 0 20 0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
21 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 22 0.1 0.75 0 0.15 0
23 0.2 0.6 0 0.2 0 24 0.85 0 0.05 0.1 0
25 0.75 0.1 0.1 0.05 0 26 0.2 0 0.7 0.1 0
27 0.1 0 0.75 0.15 0 28 0.25 0.1 0.6 0.05 0
29 0.8 0.05 0.1 0.05 0 30 0.9 0 0.05 0.05 0
31 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.25 0.5 32 0.9 0 0 0.1 0
33 0.95 0 0 0.05 0
In the assumed complex scenario above, the active power
P and the voltage U of each node are accessible, as shown in
Fig. 4a and 4b, respectively. Following Eq. (12), Fj is obtained
for Node j(j = 1, · · · , 36). The LESs of Fj are obtained as
the τT2−t curves shown in Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d.
These figures give a visualization of LESs throughout a
whole day. Particular attention should be paid to the
spikes—their corresponding time point and line number
hold vital clues about when and where the behavior occurs:
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Fig. 4: Illusion of the data and analysis of a complex scenario for behavior analysis.
• The brown line indicates τT2(B); it is relatively smooth
because the system is stable without emergencies such
as voltage collapse. Our previous work [1] verifies that
the independent random noises ,e.g., completely random
behavior, has little impact on the value of LESs.
• For fraud events, the extreme points are located at t =
5553, 6854, 7655, etc. According to Section IV-B, this
phenomenon matches Assumption IV that the CPs are at
t=14:00(5600≈5553+50), 17:00(6800≈6854−50), 19:
00(7600≈7655−50), etc., respectively.
• For TLPs, Spike 1 (X: 1250, Y: 32, Z: 4041) indicates the
existence of a CP at 3 : 00(1200=1250−50) on Node 32.
According to Tab. I, 3:00 is a CP of TLP p(α)1 . Thus we
can deduce that TLP p(α)1 takes a dominant on Node 32.
Similar deductions can be made for Node 25, 24, 30, etc.
These deductions match Assumption are confirmed by
Tab. II.
• For invisible ULPs, Spike 2 (X: 450, Y: 31 Z:4626)
indicates the existence of a CP at 1 : 00(400=450−50)
on Node 31. According to Tab. I, there is no existence
of any TLP (p(α)1 , p
(α)
2 , p
(α)
3 , p
(α)
4 ) matching CP 1:00.
As a result, we artificially build a CP at 1:00 for a
new ULP (p(β)1 for this case). Step by step, all the CPs
of ULP p(β)1 are obtained as Tab. I. Then, the general
model Eq. (14) is tuned into the classical model Eq. (2)
p(Σ) = a1p
(α)
1 + a2p
(α)
2 + a3p
(α)
3 + a4p
(α)
4 + a5p
(α)
5 .
D. Estimation with and without Invisible Units Detection
Existence of invisible units disables the classical least
squares method. Taking Node 20 for instance, without correct
detection of the invisible units, we will get a bad result as
shown in Fig. 5. However, if the information about the start
point and end point of the invisible behavior is acquired, an
accurate estimate can be obtained.
V. REAL-WORLD CASE STUDIES
1) Data: A power grid with 5 substations in China is
studied in this section as shown in Fig. 6a. For each substation,
its three-phase voltage data V and current data I are recorded
at a three-minute sampling-rate. We take a two-day time period
as the dataset, depicted in Fig. 6c, 6d, 6e, and 6f.
2) Ring Law and LES: If we choose X0 (the voltage data
during 0 a.m. to 2 a.m, Fig. 6c), the ring distribution is
obtained according to our previous work [1], as shown in Fig.
6b. Most eigenvalues are distributed between the inner circle
and the outer circle. This implies that the real-world data do
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Fig. 5: Estimate with and without Invisible Units Detection
follow the Ring Law. With a similar process, and setting the
test function as Chebyshev Polynomials T2: ϕT2(x)=2x
2−1
and the Likelihood Ratio Function LR :ϕLR(x)=x−ln(x)−1,
respectively3, the LES t−τ curves are obtain in Fig. 7a, 7b,
7c, and 7d. The grid is relatively smooth during 0 a.m. to
8 a.m. and has dramatic changes at around 8:30 a.m., 11:30
a.m., etc. This observation agrees with our common sense. For
field data, the test function may influence the results in some
complicated ways, although the LESs have a similar trend at
most CPs.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper extends our framework of using large random
matrices to model a power grid. Under the RMT-based frame-
work, a progress, aiming at the invisible units detection and
estimation task, is made from the conventional techniques such
as change point detection and least squares methods, and de-
tailed algorithms are given. Linear Eigenvalue Statistic (LES),
whose value is robust against data errors and insusceptible to
random noises, is employed as the statistic feature (or big data
analytics). Due to the high-dimensional phenomenon—arising
from considering a large number of nodes simultaneously, LES
is very appealing due to its Gaussian property implying that
the expectation E(τ) and the variance σ2(τ) are sufficient for
a complete statistic description. As a result, LES maps the
massive datasets into a standard Gaussian random variable that
is standard in classical statistics. The fundamental role of LES
is highlighted here. As an example of how LES is used, we
consider a standard (binary) hypothesis testing for invisible
unit modeling. In particular, both the fraudulent behavior,
e.g., false data injection, and anomalous power usage, e.g.,
unauthorized PV installation, are studied.
Based on mathematically rigorous RMT, time and space
must be tied together through their ratio c = T/N. What
matters is the ratio c, rather than N and T . This observation is
valid when N and T are large (for some statistical properties,
size of tens is enough) and comparable in size, which is often
true in practice.
3Our previous work [14] discusses the effectiveness of the choice of
test functions. ϕT2 (x) performs well on the calculation speed, and ϕLR(x)
performs well on the coefficient of variation in some cases.
Simulated data and real-world data are tested using our
algorithms. It is found that the experimental values of LESs
agree with the theoretical predictions. The proposed method
does provide a data-driven approach to gain insight into the
distribution network behavior and consumer profile, and a
much more accurate estimation result is obtained.
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Fig. 6: Grid Network and Raw Data of Real Case
Note: For each substation, the 3-phase data are quite similar and only B-phase data are chosen.
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Fig. 7: Illusion of the LESs of field data.
